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FORESEEABLY UNCERTAIN: THE 
(IN)ABILITY OF SCHOOL OFFICIALS TO 
REASONABLY FORESEE SUBSTANTIAL 
DISRUPTION TO THE SCHOOL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Maggie Geren* 
I. INTRODUCTION
“Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met.”1 
While the name of this Facebook page is perhaps a bit harsh, 
most would hardly view it as grounds for school suspension.  The 
very heart of the First Amendment, and indeed the notion for 
which our Framers drafted it, is the right of citizens to “think, 
speak, write and worship as they wish, not as the Government 
commands.”2  Without this fundamental freedom—one that has 
persevered despite countless efforts to narrow its reach—the 
American people would live in constant fear of backlash and 
suppression for merely voicing their opinions. 
Nevertheless, the right to freedom of speech is far from 
absolute—a concept that has, in many cases, given schools the 
green light to discipline students for social media posts like the 
one listed above.3  Although the Supreme Court has recognized 
that “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is 
nowhere more vital than in the community of American 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Arkansas School of Law. The author would like
to thank Professor Danielle Weatherby of the University of Arkansas School of Law, without 
whose guidance, insight, and experience this Comment would not have been possible; the 
Editorial Board and Staff Editors of the Arkansas Law Review for their diligence and 
attention to detail during the editing process; and her parents for their constant support and 
encouragement throughout this and every endeavor. 
1. Alex Bracetti, 25 School Suspensions Caused by Social Media, COMPLEX (Apr. 12,
2012), [https://perma.cc/V8FT-QD3U]. 
2. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
3. See Benjamin Herold, 10 Social Media Controversies That Landed Students in
Trouble This Year, EDUC. WEEK (July 6, 2017), [https://perma.cc/B8F5-V6GV]. 
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schools,”4 the precise extent to which the First Amendment 
protects student speech remains ambiguous.5  As students 
increasingly turn to social media to criticize their classmates, 
teachers, and other school administrators, courts are struggling 
with how to maintain the necessary balance between a student’s 
free speech rights and a school’s authority to protect the school 
environment from disruption.6  In the Second, Seventh, and 
Eighth Circuits, the latter frequently prevails, as schools are 
permitted to restrict student speech when it is “reasonably 
foreseeable” that the speech will reach the school environment 
and create a material and substantial disruption.7 
This Article will begin with a discussion of the Supreme 
Court’s existing jurisprudence regarding on-campus student 
speech, including the Court’s landmark holding in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent School District,8 as well as the three so-
called “exceptions” to the Tinker standard.  It will then discuss 
the various approaches federal appellate courts have developed in 
their attempts to apply Tinker to off-campus student speech, 
followed by an analysis of the relationship between those 
approaches and the foreseeability threshold.  Finally, it will 
address the various concerns scholars have raised in response to 
4. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
5. See Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering with Students’ Rights: The Need for an
Enhanced First Amendment Standard to Protect Off-Campus Student Internet Speech, 36 
CAP. U. L. REV. 129, 132-33 (2007) (noting that while “the Supreme Court has addressed 
the First Amendment rights of public school students in on-campus speech,” it “has yet to 
define students’ First Amendment rights in any form of off-campus speech”). 
6. Lily M. Strumwasser, Testing the Social Media Waters: First Amendment
Entanglement Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates, 36 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2013) 
(describing the dilemma that courts face regarding off-campus student speech and First 
Amendment rights); see also Markey, supra note 5, at 151-56 (discussing the strength of the 
school district’s interest in preserving order as compared to the student’s interest in off-
campus Internet speech). 
7. Courts have applied the “reasonable foreseeability” threshold to various different
types of speech, both on and off campus.  See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2007) (student’s violent instant messaging icon); 
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50-51 (2d Cir. 2008) (student’s derogatory blog post about 
a school’s cancellation of an upcoming student event); Scoville v. Bd. of Educ. of Joliet 
Township High Sch. Dist. 204, 425 F.2d 10, 15 (7th Cir. 1970) (articles in an off-campus 
student newspaper that criticized school policies); D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 
60, 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011) (instant messages describing a plan to shoot several 
students). 
8. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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the foreseeability threshold, including that it is overly broad, 
gives school administrators virtually unlimited discretion to 
punish students for off-campus speech, and provides little 
protection for online speech. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE
REGARDING ON-CAMPUS STUDENT SPEECH
This Part will begin by discussing the Supreme Court’s 
famous holding in Tinker, the first case to affirmatively address 
student free speech rights.  It will then identify and explain the 
three major exceptions the Court has crafted to the Tinker 
standard, each of which permits a school to restrict student speech 
under a particular set of circumstances. 
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District and the “Substantial Disruption” Standard
In Tinker, a group of adults and students in Des Moines,
Iowa, planned to protest the United States’ involvement in the 
Vietnam War by wearing black armbands and fasting during the 
holiday season.9  Upon discovering the protest, several school 
principals held a meeting, during which they adopted a policy 
mandating an automatic suspension for any student who wore a 
political armband to school and subsequently refused to remove 
it.10  A few days later, a group of students wore black armbands 
to school and were suspended.11  The students subsequently 
brought an action against the school challenging the 
constitutionality of the suspensions.12 
Although the Supreme Court recognized that states have an 
interest in maintaining order and discipline in their schools,13 it 
ultimately ruled that, under the present circumstances, the 
9. Id. at 504.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for
affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with 
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”).  
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students’ First Amendment rights outweighed that interest.14  
Writing for the majority, Justice Fortas emphasized the Court’s 
“unmistakable holding” that “[n]either students [n]or teachers 
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression 
at the schoolhouse gate.”15  To determine whether a school may 
permissibly restrict student speech under the First Amendment, 
the Court adopted a “substantial disruption” standard.16  Under 
this standard, a school may impose restrictions on student speech 
only if the speech “materially disrupts classwork or involves 
substantial disorder or the invasion of the rights of others.”17  
Furthermore, the Court’s opinion made clear that 
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not 
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression,” nor is “a 
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”18 
B. Exceptions to the Tinker Standard
Following its holding in Tinker, the Court delivered three 
more landmark opinions, each of which represents a different 
exception to the substantial disruption standard.19  The first, 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, involved the punishment 
of a student who used vulgar and offensive language at a school 
assembly.20  The second, Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier, involved the deletion of articles in a school newspaper 
that described students’ experiences with pregnancy and 
14. Id. at 514.
15. Id. at 506.
16. Id. at 513.
17. Id.  See also Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that
schools officials cannot infringe on a student’s right to free speech and expression where the 
speech does not “materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school”). 
18. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 509.
19. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  The trilogy
of cases following Tinker has been described as “impos[ing] qualifications and limitations
on the scope of Tinker.”  R. George Wright, Post-Tinker, 10 STAN. CIV. RTS. & CIV.
LIBERTIES 1, 4 (2014).
20. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677-78.
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divorce.21  Finally, Morse v. Frederick involved the punishment 
of a student who refused to take down a banner at a school-
sponsored event which read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”22  
Collectively, these cases represent the three sets of circumstances 
in which the Court has recognized that, contrary to Tinker, a 
school’s interests outweigh its students’ free speech rights.  
Accordingly, a school is permitted to discipline students when 
their speech fits into one of these pre-determined categories. 
1. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
In Fraser, a student at Bethel High School in Pierce County, 
Washington, delivered a speech nominating one of his classmates 
for election to student office.23  The speech took place at an 
assembly where approximately 600 students were present.24  
Throughout the course of the speech, the student allegedly used 
“elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor[s]” when 
describing the candidate.25  Deciding that the student’s conduct 
violated its rule against the use of obscene language which 
“materially and substantially interferes with the educational 
process,” the school suspended him for three days and 
disqualified him as a candidate for commencement speaker.26  
The student then brought an action against the school alleging a 
violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.27  
Finding in favor of the student, the Western District of 
Washington held that the suspension violated the student’s free 
speech rights under the First Amendment.28  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, finding no significant distinction between the student’s 
speech and the political armbands at issue in Tinker.29 
Reasoning that the school’s interest in educating its students 
to be civil and mature citizens outweighed the student’s right to 
21. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 263-64.
22. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397-98.
23. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 677-78.
26. Id. at 678.
27. Id. at 679.
28. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 679.
29. Id.
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free speech, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
suspension did not violate the student’s First Amendment rights.30  
In doing so, it carved out an exception to the Tinker standard, 
permitting schools to punish students for “lewd, indecent, or 
offensive speech and conduct.”31  Despite the Court’s holding in 
Tinker that public school students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate,”32 the Court in Fraser emphasized that “the 
constitutional rights of students in public school are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings.”33 
2. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Just two years after its holding in Fraser, the Court was 
faced with the unique issue of whether a school could regulate 
speech contained within a student newspaper prior to its 
publication.34  In Kuhlmeier, members of a journalism class at 
Hazelwood East High School were responsible for the publication 
of a student newspaper entitled Spectrum.35  Before publishing an 
issue, it was customary for the class to submit a proof of the 
newspaper to the school principal for his approval.36  In this case, 
the principal forbade the students from publishing two stories—
one which described “three . . . students’ experiences with 
pregnancy,” and another which “discussed the impact of divorce 
on students at the school.”37  The Eastern District of Missouri held 
that the school’s actions did not violate the students’ First 
Amendment rights, noting that school administrators possess the 
authority to restrict student speech in activities that are “an 
30. Id. at 685.  “[I]t is a highly appropriate function of public school education to
prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”  Id. at 683. 
31. Id. (“The schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential
lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, 
or offensive speech and conduct . . . .”). 
32. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
33. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
34. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263-64 (1988).
35. Id. at 262.
36. Id. at 263.
37. Id.
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integral part of the school’s educational function.”38  The Eighth 
Circuit reversed, emphasizing the newspaper’s status as a public 
forum that precluded school officials from censoring its 
contents.39 
Similar to what it had done in Fraser, the Court in Kuhlmeier 
abandoned a traditional Tinker analysis and elected to follow a 
reasonableness standard instead.40  It reasoned that the issue 
involved in this case was entirely separate from that of Tinker.41  
Tinker asked the Court to consider whether the First Amendment 
requires a school to merely tolerate student speech, whereas 
Kuhlmeier asked the Court to evaluate whether the First 
Amendment requires a school to affirmatively promote student 
speech.42  The latter of these issues concerns the school’s 
authority over “expressive activities that students, parents, and 
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the 
imprimatur of the school” and “may fairly be characterized as part 
of the school curriculum.”43  Accordingly, it held that Tinker was 
not the appropriate standard, and that school officials may 
regulate “the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”44 
3. Morse v. Frederick
The third major exception to the Tinker standard emerged in 
Morse, nearly thirty years after the Court’s holding in 
Kuhlmeier.45  In Morse, a high school principal in Juneau, Alaska, 
permitted students to gather along a street in front of the school 
as the Olympic Torch Relay passed through the city.46  During the 
relay, a group of students unveiled a banner which read “BONG 
38. Id. at 264 (internal quotations omitted).
39. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 265.
40. Id. at 272-73.
41. Id. at 270-71.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 271.
44. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272-73.
45. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
46. Id. at 397.
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HiTS 4 JESUS.”47  After one of the students refused to take the 
banner down, the principal suspended him for ten days, claiming 
that the banner encouraged illegal drug use in violation of school 
policy.48  Finding in favor of the school, the District of Alaska 
held that the principal had the proper authority to prohibit such 
messages taking place at a school-sanctioned activity.49  The 
Ninth Circuit reversed, finding a violation of the student’s First 
Amendment rights.50 
Although the speech did not technically occur on school 
property, the Supreme Court rejected the student’s argument that 
this was not a school speech case, explaining that the speech took 
place during normal school hours at “an approved social event” 
or “class trip” and was therefore subject to student conduct 
rules.51  Nevertheless, the Court refused to apply Tinker, 
reasoning that the concern in this case went far beyond a mere 
desire to avoid controversy.52  Given the serious problem with 
drug abuse among young people, coupled with the government 
interest in stopping such abuse, the Court held that schools are 
free to regulate student speech that they “reasonably regard as 
promoting illegal drug use.”53 
III. VARYING APPLICATIONS OF TINKER TO OFF-
CAMPUS STUDENT SPEECH 
Although the Supreme Court has analyzed the issue of 
whether—and under what circumstances—a school may 
permissibly restrict on-campus student speech, it has not yet done 
so for off-campus student speech.54  As a result, lower courts have 
47. Id.
48. Id. at 398.
49. Id. at 399.
50. Morse, 551 U.S. at 399.
51. Id. at 400-01.
52. Id. at 408-09.
53. Id. at 408.
54. See Katherine A. Ferry, Reviewing the Impact of the Supreme Court’s
Interpretation of “Social Media” as Applied to Off-Campus Student Speech, 49 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 717, 730 (2018).
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been left without any clear guidance as to how they should 
analyze student speech that occurs outside the schoolhouse gate.55 
Absent a ruling from the Supreme Court, the majority of 
federal appellate courts have attempted to apply different 
variations of Tinker and its exceptions to off-campus student 
speech.56  For example, the Fourth Circuit has adopted a 
“sufficient nexus” threshold to Tinker,57 whereas the Eleventh 
Circuit applies a “true threat” approach in addition to a traditional 
Tinker analysis.58  The Ninth Circuit declines to extend Tinker at 
all unless faced with an “identifiable threat of school violence,”59 
while the Fifth Circuit modifies its approach to the specific facts 
of each case.60  The Second, Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits 
apply a simple foreseeability threshold to Tinker,61 although the 
Third Circuit places a greater emphasis on the student’s intent.62  
The remaining appellate courts, including the First, Sixth, Tenth, 
and D.C. Circuits, have yet to address Tinker’s application to off-
campus student speech.63 
A. The “Sufficient Nexus” Threshold
In Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, the Fourth Circuit 
was faced with the issue of whether a school had authority to 
discipline a student who created a webpage for the purpose of 
ridiculing a fellow classmate.64  In making this determination, the 
court adopted a “sufficient nexus” threshold, under which it 
considered whether the nexus between the student’s speech and 
55. Id.
56. Id. (“The majority of federal appellate courts apply some variation of Tinker to
students’ off-campus speech, but differ in their applications and use of the exceptions set 
forth in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse.”); William Calve, The Amplified Need for Supreme 
Court Guidance on Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 377, 386 
(2016) (“Circuit courts have continuously invoked Tinker to regulate off-campus 
cyberspeech, particularly when the speech is violent or threatening, but the method of 
application is inconsistent across the country.”). 
57. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011).
58. See Boim v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11th Cir. 2007).
59. See Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013).
60. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 395-96 (5th Cir. 2015).
61. See infra Section III.E.
62. See infra Section III.E.
63. Ferry, supra note 54, at 741.
64. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
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the school’s pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong to 
justify disciplinary action.65  Because the student knew that the 
content of the webpage would be available to other students and 
“could reasonably be expected to reach the school or impact the 
school environment,” the court reasoned that there was a 
sufficient nexus to warrant the suspension.66  Furthermore, 
although the student created the webpage at home rather than on 
school property, it caused substantial disruption in the school and 
was therefore subject to discipline under a traditional Tinker 
analysis.67 
B. The True Threat Approach
In Boim v. Fulton County School District, the Eleventh 
Circuit applied a “true threat” approach in addition to a traditional 
Tinker analysis.68  Boim concerned a high school student who 
wrote an entry in her notebook describing the detailed murder of 
her math teacher.69  Upon discovery of the notebook, the school 
principal suspended the student for ten days and recommended 
that she be expelled.70  The court held that the student’s speech 
unequivocally created a material and substantial disruption in the 
school, and thus satisfied Tinker, but delved even further into the 
threatening nature of the notebook entry.71  Given the 
government’s interest in preventing school violence, it concluded 
that “there . . . is no First Amendment right allowing a student to 
knowingly make comments, whether oral or written, that 
reasonably could be perceived as a threat of school violence, 
whether general or specific, while on school property during the 
school day.”72 
65. Id. at 573.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 574.
68. Boim v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11th Cir. 2007).
69. Id. at 980-81.
70. Id. at 981-82.
71. Id. at 983.
72. Id. at 984.
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C. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach
The Ninth Circuit’s approach is similar to that of the 
Eleventh Circuit and focuses on whether the student speech 
creates a threat to the school environment.73  In Wynar v. Douglas 
County School District, a student sent a series of MySpace 
messages to his friends describing his plan to bring a gun to 
school and shoot several of his classmates.74  His friends reported 
the messages to a football coach and then notified the school 
principal.75  At a school board hearing, the board decided that the 
student had violated a Nevada statute and expelled him for ninety 
days.76 
Noting the obvious differences between a parody social 
media account and the threat of a school shooting, the court was 
reluctant to adopt a “one-size fits all approach” to student speech 
cases.77  It also declined to adopt any of the threshold tests 
developed in other circuits, reasoning that each of them would be 
easily satisfied under the present set of circumstances.78  
Nevertheless, the court held that “when faced with an identifiable 
threat of school violence, schools may take disciplinary action in 
response to off-campus speech that meets the requirements of 
Tinker.”79  Accordingly, the court concluded that the actions of 
the school board in this case were constitutional.80 
D. The Fifth Circuit’s Approach
Although the Fifth Circuit historically analyzed off-campus 
student speech cases using a strict Tinker analysis,81 it changed its 
approach in 2001 with its decision in Porter v. Ascension Parish 
73. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013).
74. Id. at 1065-66.
75. Id. at 1066.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1069.
78. Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1072.
81. See Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972) (“[T]he
activity punished here does not even approach the ‘material and substantial’ disruption that 
must accompany an exercise of expression . . . .  As a factual matter there were no . . . 
disturbances of any sort, on or off campus, related to the distribution of the [newspaper].”). 
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School Board.82  In Porter, the court departed from Tinker and 
held that school administrators violated the First Amendment 
when they punished a student for a violent drawing because the 
student never intended for the drawing to reach the school.83  
Rather than attempting to apply a one-size fits all approach, as it 
had done in previous decades, the Fifth Circuit tweaked its 
approach to accommodate the specific facts before it.84 
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit decided its first case dealing with 
off-campus cyber speech.85  Bell v. Itawamba County School 
Board involved a student who was suspended after he recorded a 
rap song making vulgar and threatening comments toward several 
school administrators, then posted the song to his Facebook 
profile.86  Relying on Porter, in which the student’s intent played 
a large role in the court’s decision, the court held that “[a] 
speaker’s intention that his speech reach the school community, 
buttressed by his actions in bringing about that consequence, 
supports applying Tinker’s . . . standard to that speech.”87  Thus, 
under the Fifth Circuit’s approach, Tinker applies when a student 
intentionally directs threatening, harassing, or intimidating 
speech at the school community, regardless of where the speech 
originates.88 
E. The Foreseeability Threshold
The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits incorporate an 
additional foreseeability threshold to the Tinker analysis.  The 
Seventh Circuit was the first to adopt this approach when it 
addressed its first case dealing with off-campus student speech, 
Scoville v. Board of Education of Joliet Township.89  In Scoville, 
82. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004).
83. Id. at 620 (“Because [the student]’s drawing was composed off-campus, displayed
only to members of his own household, stored off-campus, and not purposefully taken by 
him to [school] or publicized in a way certain to result in its appearance at [school], we have 
found that the drawing is protected by the First Amendment.”). 
84. Id. at 615.
85. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
86. Id. at 383-85.
87. Id. at 395.
88. Id. at 396.
89. Scoville v. Bd. of Educ. of Joliet Twp., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970).
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the court was faced with the issue of whether a school could 
discipline students for writing articles in an off-campus 
newspaper criticizing the school’s policies and authorities.90  
Because school administrators could not “reasonably forecast that 
the publication and distribution of [the] paper . . . would 
substantially disrupt or materially interfere with school 
procedures,” the court reasoned that a suspension would violate 
the students’ First Amendment rights.91 
The next court to adopt the foreseeability threshold was the 
Second Circuit in 2007.92  In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of 
the Weedsport Central School District, the court addressed 
whether a school could punish an eighth-grade student for 
creating an instant messaging icon suggesting that his teacher 
should be shot and killed, then sending the icon to several of his 
classmates.93  Opining that there was “a reasonably foreseeable 
risk that the icon would come to the attention of school 
authorities” and “materially and substantially disrupt the work 
and discipline of the school,” the court held that the school’s 
actions were permissible under the First Amendment.94 
In 2008, the Second Circuit again addressed the issue of 
whether a school could punish a student for off-campus cyber 
speech.95  In Doninger v. Niehoff, school officials disqualified a 
student from running for Senior Class Secretary after she wrote a 
blog post criticizing the school and encouraging readers to harass 
its administrators.96  Using the approach set forth in Wisniewski, 
the court held that it was reasonably foreseeable that the student’s 
blog post would reach school grounds and create a substantial 
disruption, thus warranting the disqualification.97 
Finally, the Eighth Circuit applied the foreseeability 
threshold in 2011 and 2012 when it addressed two cases 
90. Id. at 11.
91. Id. at 15.
92. See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38-39
(2d Cir. 2007). 
93. Id. at 35-36.
94. Id. at 38-39 (internal quotations omitted).
95. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
96. Id. at 45-46.
97. Id. at 50-51.
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pertaining to off-campus cyber speech.98  The first, D.J.M. v. 
Hannibal Public School District No. 60, involved a student who 
was suspended for sending instant messages to one of his friends, 
in which he described a plan to obtain a gun and shoot several of 
his classmates.99  Ultimately, the court held that the suspension 
was constitutional under both a “true threat” approach and 
Tinker.100  In making the latter determination, the court opined 
that “it was reasonably foreseeable that [the student]’s threats 
about shooting specific students in school would be brought to the 
attention of school authorities and create a risk of substantial 
disruption within the school environment.”101 
The second case, S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 
School District, involved two students who were suspended after 
they created a blog and used it to post a variety of offensive, racist, 
and sexually explicit comments about several of their 
classmates.102  In determining whether the suspension was 
constitutional, the court concluded that because the speech was 
targeted at the school and “could reasonably be expected to reach 
the school or impact the environment,” Tinker applied, regardless 
of the speech’s location.103 
In addition, the Third Circuit applies a foreseeability 
threshold similar to that of the Second, Seventh, and Eighth 
Circuits, but alters its approach to focus specifically on the 
student’s intent.104  For example, in J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue 
Mountain School District, a student was suspended after he 
created a parody social media account of his school’s principal.105  
Unlike other circuits applying the foreseeability threshold, the 
court evaluated the student’s intent to determine whether it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the profile would create a substantial 
98. D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011); S.J.W.
v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012).
99. D.J.M., 647 F.3d at 758-59.
100. Id. at 761-66.
101. Id. at 766.
102. S.J.W., 696 F.3d at 773-74.
103. Id. at 778 (citing Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir.
2011)). 
104. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d Cir.
2011). 
105. Id. at 920.
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disruption in the school.106  Because the student did not intend for 
the profile to reach school grounds, the court held that it was not 
reasonably foreseeable that it would cause a substantial 
disruption.107  Accordingly, the court held that the school’s 
actions were unconstitutional.108 
IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
FORESEEABILITY THRESHOLD AND OTHER 
CIRCUITS’ APPROACHES 
The foreseeability threshold utilized in the Second, Seventh, 
and Eighth Circuits asks courts to first consider whether it was 
reasonably foreseeable that a student’s speech would reach the 
school.109  Once the court has determined that the speech satisfies 
this initial threshold requirement, it may then apply the traditional 
Tinker analysis, considering whether it was likely that the speech 
would create a material and substantial disruption.110  This Part 
will address the complex relationship between this approach and 
threshold requirements in other jurisdictions.  In particular, it will 
discuss the relative scopes of each approach, including the 
relevance of the nature of the speech and the speaker’s intent, as 
well as the relative importance of a nexus between the speech and 
the school’s interests. 
A. Nature of the Speech and the Speaker’s Intent
The foreseeability threshold is indubitably more expansive 
than threshold requirements imposed in other jurisdictions, 
specifically those in the Eleventh, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits, all of 
106. Id. at 921-25.
107. Id. at 930.
108. Id. at 931.
109. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A] student may be
disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct occurring off school grounds, when this 
conduct ‘would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school 
environment,’ at least when it was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression 
might also reach campus.”) (internal citations omitted). 
110. Id.
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which are defined quite narrowly in their respective scopes.111  
For example, before applying Tinker, the Eleventh Circuit first 
considers whether a student’s speech “reasonably could be 
perceived as a threat of school violence.”112  Similarly, the Ninth 
Circuit permits schools to restrict student speech only after it has 
made the initial determination that the speech creates an 
“identifiable threat of school violence.”113  Although the Fifth 
Circuit focuses on the student’s intent in delivering the speech, 
rather than the threatening nature of the speech itself, it similarly 
focuses on just one element in particular—namely, “[the] 
speaker’s intention that his speech reach the school community, 
buttressed by his actions in bringing about that 
consequence . . . .”114 
Due to its expansive scope, the foreseeability threshold 
seemingly restricts all forms of violent or threatening speech, as 
well as that which the speaker intentionally directs toward the 
school.  Stated differently, any speech that results in a perceived 
or actual threat of school violence, as required for discipline under 
the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits’ approaches, respectively, is 
likely to create a foreseeable risk of disruption to the school 
environment.115  Likewise, any speech that is intentionally 
directed toward the school, as required under the Fifth Circuit’s 
approach, will almost certainly satisfy the foreseeability 
threshold.116  This is evidenced by the manner in which courts 
applying the foreseeability threshold have consistently ruled in 
favor of the school when deciding cases involving these types of 
speech.117 
111. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV.
1027, 1059-64 (2008). 
112. Boim v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11th Cir. 2007).
113. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013).
114. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 395 (5th Cir. 2015).
115. Papandrea, supra note 111, at 1091.
116. Id. at 1091-92 (“Students’ speech frequently concerns topics related to their
school and classmates.  Given this reality, it is hard to imagine when it would not be directed 
to campus, or when it would not be reasonably foreseeable that students’ digital expression 
would come to the school’s attention.”). 
117. For cases involving violent or threatening speech, see, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of
Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. 
Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001); Bell, 799 F.3d 379.  For cases involving speech 
intentionally directed at the school, see, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 
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Nevertheless, while the nature of the speech and the 
student’s intent are often relevant considerations in determining 
whether it was reasonably foreseeable that a student’s speech 
would reach the school environment, they are by no means 
prerequisites.118  The foreseeability threshold is not limited to 
certain types of speech, but rather applies broadly to any and all 
types of speech that school administrators may reasonably foresee 
reaching the school environment.119  Therefore, it is certainly 
possible that the foreseeability threshold may permit schools to 
restrict student speech that is neither violent in nature nor directed 
at the school. 
B. Nexus Between the Speech and the School’s Interests
Although the Fourth Circuit’s sufficient nexus threshold is
undoubtedly less expansive than the foreseeability threshold, both 
approaches similarly restrict more speech than threshold 
requirements imposed in other jurisdictions.120  As stated 
previously, the sufficient nexus threshold allows a school to 
discipline students for off-campus speech that has a sufficient 
nexus to the school’s pedagogical interests.121  The problem with 
this approach is that it fails to specifically define which interests 
will warrant discipline, effectively permitting a school to justify 
suspension or expulsion by choosing any interest that may 
conceivably promote the education of its students or protect their 
2008); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010); Boucher 
v. Sch. Bd. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area
Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
118. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1111-
15 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (listing several factors courts may consider in determining whether 
speech is reasonably likely to cause a substantial disruption, including: (1) whether “students 
are discussing the speech at issue”; (2) whether “a student’s speech is violent or threatening 
to members of the school”; (3) “whether school administrators are pulled away from their 
ordinary tasks to respond to or mitigate the effects of a student’s speech”; and (4) “whether 
the school’s decision to discipline is based on evidence or facts indicating a foreseeable risk 
of disruption, rather than undifferentiated fears or mere disapproval of the speech”). 
119. Id. at 1107.
120. See Ferry, supra note 54, at 755-56 (“The sufficient nexus threshold is overly
broad and fails to define what interests will warrant discipline for off-campus, online 
speech.”). 
121. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011).
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health and safety.122  Because there are an endless variety of 
interests for the school to choose from—including health, safety, 
diversity, and countless others—it is virtually guaranteed to find 
one that fits the circumstances of the speech.123  The sufficient 
nexus and foreseeability thresholds are similar in this regard 
because they both grant school administrators broad authority to 
discipline students for nearly any type of speech, unlike the 
narrow approaches of the Eleventh, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits. 
Nevertheless, while the sufficient nexus and foreseeability 
thresholds may closely resemble one another in their 
expansiveness, they are not indistinguishable.  Similar to the 
nature of the speech and the speaker’s intent, any nexus between 
the speech and the school’s interests is merely a relevant factor in 
determining whether the speech satisfies the foreseeability 
threshold, as opposed to a necessary condition.124  While such a 
nexus would certainly increase the likelihood that the speech will 
reach the school environment, the foreseeability threshold may 
arguably permit school administrators to punish students for 
speech that bears no connection whatsoever to the pedagogical 
interests of the school.  That is, to justify punishment, the school 
need only establish that it was reasonably foreseeable that the 
speech would come to the attention of school administrators—it 
is not required to demonstrate any nexus between the speech and 
the school’s interests.125  Thus, while the two approaches are 
similar in certain respects, the foreseeability threshold is much 
more expansive than the sufficient nexus threshold. 
122. The interests the school articulated in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools were
student health and safety against cyberbullying—however, the court’s approach ultimately 
has the effect of allowing schools to choose any interest that fits the circumstances of the 
speech.  Id. at 572.  
123. For additional examples of interests that courts have held to justify school
discipline, see, e.g., id. (interest in preventing bullying); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 
407 (2007) (interest in “deterring drug use by schoolchildren”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 679-80 (1986) (interest in protecting schoolchildren from lewd and 
indecent language). 
124. Ferry, supra note 54, at 758-759.
125. Id. at 735.
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V. CRITICISMS OF THE FORESEEABILITY
THRESHOLD 
While, from an outside perspective, the foreseeability 
threshold may appear to be a rather simple and straightforward 
approach, it has proven to be just the opposite.  This Part will 
identify the various concerns scholars have raised in response to 
the foreseeability threshold.  Chief among them are the ideas that 
the threshold is overly broad, grants too much discretion to school 
administrators, and provides little protection for online speech. 
A. Overly Broad in Scope
As noted, the foreseeability threshold is much more 
expansive than threshold requirements imposed in other 
jurisdictions.  This has given rise to perhaps the most obvious and 
widely expressed shortcoming of the foreseeability threshold—
that it is overly broad and fails to define the precise types of 
speech that fall within its scope.126  Just as the Supreme Court has 
yet to articulate a clear standard for the regulation of off-campus 
student speech, there are similarly no guidelines for lower courts 
to follow in determining whether it was reasonably foreseeable 
that a student’s speech would reach the school and create a risk of 
substantial disruption.127 
Consider, for example, the Second Circuit’s holding in 
Doninger v. Niehoff.128  As mentioned previously, Doninger 
involved a student-written blog post criticizing school 
126. See, e.g., Ferry, supra note 54, at 751 (“[T]he test articulated in Doninger fails to
define the content that is within its intended scope.”); Daniel Marcus-Toll, Tinker Gone 
Viral: Diverging Threshold Tests for Analyzing School Regulation of Off-Campus Digital 
Student Speech, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3395, 3430 (2014) (“[T]he Doninger test, as 
articulated, fails to define or otherwise qualify the content within its intended scope.”); 
Nathan S. Fronk, Doninger v. Niehoff: An Example of Public Schools’ Paternalism and the 
Off-Campus Restriction of Students’ First Amendment Rights, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1417, 
1438 (2010) (“[D]ecisions such as Doninger . . . allow schools to punish students for any 
speech that the school deems as creating even a remote risk of disruption.”). 
127. Compare Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying the
reasonable foreseeability threshold and upholding the punishment of a student for an off-
campus blog post), with Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 
216, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying the reasonable foreseeability test with a focus on the 
student’s intent and vacating the punishment for an off-campus blog post). 
128. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 41.
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administrators and encouraging peers to harass them.129  In 
determining whether the foreseeability threshold was satisfied, 
the court placed special emphasis on both the student’s intent and 
the content of the speech.130  Finding that the post “directly 
pertained to [school] events,” and that the student’s “intent in 
writing it was specifically to encourage her fellow students to read 
and respond,” the court confidently held that “it was reasonably 
foreseeable that other . . . students would view the blog and that 
school administrators would become aware of it.”131  However, it 
failed to specify other types of speech that would fall within the 
scope of the foreseeability threshold, thus providing little help to 
future courts attempting to apply this standard. 
Due to its overbreadth, some scholars have expressed 
concern that the foreseeability threshold may lead to a chilling 
effect on constitutionally protected forms of speech.132  Judge 
Smith alluded to this premise in his concurring opinion in Snyder 
v. Blue Mountain School District, in which he presented the
following hypothetical:
Suppose a high school student, while at home after 
school hours, were to write a blog entry defending gay 
marriage.  Suppose further that several of the student’s 
classmates got wind of the entry, took issue with it, and 
caused a significant disturbance at school.  While the school 
could clearly punish the students who acted disruptively, if 
Tinker were held to apply to off-campus speech, the school 
could also punish the student whose blog entry brought about 
the disruption.133 
129. Id. at 45.
130. Id. at 50-51.
131. Id. at 50.
132. Ferry, supra note 54, at 751-52 (“Political speech has consistently been protected,
but the breadth of this specific test could become a vehicle to suppress this type of conduct.”); 
Marcus-Toll, supra note 126, at 3430 (“[T]he Second Circuit did not unambiguously limit 
its test only to circumstances involving off-campus digital student speech.  Consequently, 
this approach entails a considerable risk of chilling protected speech.”). 
133. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 939 (3d Cir. 2011)
(Smith, J., concurring).  “A bare foreseeability standard could be stretched too far, and would 
risk ensnaring any off-campus expression that happened to discuss school-related matters.” 
Id. at 940.  
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Political speech is “at the core of what the First Amendment 
is designed to protect.”134  This is evident through the vast number 
of statutes and policies the Supreme Court has rejected, either 
because they sought to regulate political speech directly or 
created “an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas.”135  For 
example, in Virginia v. Black, the Court held that a statute 
prohibiting cross burning, as the jury instruction had construed it, 
“chill[ed] constitutionally protected political speech because of 
the possibility that the Commonwealth [would] prosecute—and 
potentially convict—somebody engaging only in lawful political 
speech . . . .”136 
Similar to the statute at issue in Black, the foreseeability 
threshold creates a risk of chilling constitutionally protected 
speech by restricting more speech than necessary to protect a 
school’s interests.137  Because the test lacks any clear scope, there 
are essentially no limitations on the types of student speech that a 
school may discipline.  Thus, school administrators may 
theoretically be justified in punishing a student for speech that, 
under any other circumstances, would be afforded the highest 
level of constitutional protection, so long as it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the speech will reach the school and create a 
substantial disruption.  This approach inevitably creates “an 
unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas” by causing students 
to refrain from voicing their opinions due to fear of punishment 
by school administrators.138 
B. Affords Unlimited Discretion to School Administrators
A second concern that scholars have expressed regarding the
foreseeability threshold is that it affords school administrators too 
much discretion in determining which types of speech constitute 
134. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Ferry, supra note 54, at 752 (“[T]he reasonable foreseeability threshold does not
define the type of speech that one could reasonably foresee causing a substantial disruption. 
In this regard, the test serves to limit more speech than necessary to protect the interests of 
the schools.”). 
138. Black, 538 U.S. at 365.
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a basis for discipline.139  Absent any clear definition of 
“reasonably foreseeable,” whether a student’s speech satisfies the 
foreseeability threshold is a purely subjective inquiry.140  Thus, 
under this standard, school administrators are frequently 
permitted to characterize any speech as reasonably likely to reach 
the school environment and create a substantial disruption, even 
if the only basis for doing so is disapproval of the student’s 
message.141  This is akin to viewpoint discrimination, which the 
Supreme Court has held to be “an egregious form of content 
discrimination” and therefore a “blatant” violation of the First 
Amendment.142  Furthermore, the Court expressly rejected such 
an action in Tinker when it held that a “mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompanies an 
139. Ferry, supra note 54, at 752-54 (“[T]he test affords school administrators . . .
broad discretion to characterize any speech they find offensive as reasonably foreseeable to 
reach school grounds.”); Allison E. Hayes, From Armbands to Douchebags: How Doninger 
v. Niehoff Shows the Supreme Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age, 43
AKRON L. REV. 247, 279 (2010) (“Giving administrators this sort of unfettered discretion
could potentially chill all juvenile speech.”); Papandrea, supra note 111, at 1091 ([F]ar more
disconcerting are the expansive territorial approaches that permit schools to punish student
speech whenever it is directed to campus, or when it is reasonably foreseeable that it will
come to the attention of school authorities.  These approaches grant schools virtually
unbridled discretion to restrict juvenile speech generally.”); Darin M. Williams, Tinker
Operationalized: The Judiciary’s Practical Answer to Student Cyberspeech, 62 DEPAUL L.
REV. 125, 152 (2012) (“[U]nder the operationalized Tinker standard . . . schools clearly have
broad authority . . . .  This leads to concern that schools have used, and will continue to use, 
this wide deference to unconstitutionally infringe upon the First Amendment rights of 
students.”); Travis Miller, Doninger v. Niehoff: Taking Tinker Too Far, 5 LIBERTY U. L. 
REV. 303, 324 (2011) (“Tinker’s substantial disruption test allows school administrators to 
punish online student speech that caused no substantial disruption in the past and will not 
cause a substantial disruption in the future . . . .”). 
140. Ferry, supra note 54, at 753 (“Whether it is reasonably foreseeable that speech
will reach school property is certainly subjective, and what is foreseeable to one 
administrator may not be foreseeable to another.”). 
141. Miller, supra note 139, at 332 (arguing that the test announced in Doninger has
been wrongly “used retroactively to punish a student for online and off-campus speech that 
could have but did not, and likely will not, cause a substantial disruption”). 
142. Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“When the government targets
not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the 
First Amendment is all the more blatant.”); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423 
(2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that permitting schools to prohibit speech that 
conflicts with their self-defined educational mission “would give public school authorities a 
license to suppress speech on political and social issues based on disagreement with the 
viewpoint expressed”). 
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unpopular viewpoint” is not enough to overcome a student’s First 
Amendment rights.143 
A possible response to this criticism is the argument that 
schools maintain purposeful discretion over students because they 
are acting in loco parentis, or “in the place of a parent.”144  
According to the doctrine of in loco parentis, when parents place 
their children into the public education system, they delegate a 
portion of their parental authority to school administrators, who 
are then authorized to discipline those students as would the 
students’ parents.145  Additionally, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that school officials possess “comprehensive 
authority” over students,146 and must frequently perform 
“important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions.”147  As 
such, federal courts should generally refrain from interfering with 
the resolution of conflicts that arise in the context of public school 
systems.148 
While school officials are in fact guaranteed a certain level 
of discretion by virtue of the in loco parentis doctrine, their 
authority to impose discipline is expressly limited to that which 
is “necessary to answer for the purposes for which [they are] 
employed.”149  With this limitation in mind, it is doubtful that 
such discretion was intended to encompass a school’s authority to 
punish students for speech which takes place away from school 
143. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
144. in loco parentis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
145. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 441.  For a detailed discussion of the
in loco parentis doctrine, see Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Morse, 551 U.S. at 
413-16 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas possesses the rather draconian view
that parents, to the extent they do not approve of the discipline imposed by public schools,
“can seek redress in school boards or legislatures; they can send their children to private
schools or homeschool them; or they can simply move.”  Id. at 420.
146. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
655 (1995) (describing public school administrators’ power as both “custodial and tutelary”). 
147. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
148. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864
(1982); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (“[T]he 
education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state 
and local school officials, and not of federal judges.”). 
149. BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at 453 (“[A parent] may also delegate part of his
parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in 
loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. 
that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is 
employed.”). 
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grounds, such as in the privacy of a student’s home.  The only 
way that punishment would be justified under these 
circumstances is if it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the speech 
would reach the school and create a substantial disruption.150  
However, as discussed earlier, this is a purely subjective inquiry.  
Thus, school officials are often permitted to punish students for 
off-campus speech even if it is unlikely that the speech will 
actually come to the attention of school authorities and create a 
substantial disruption.  In this regard, school officials are 
exercising discretion well beyond that which is granted to them 
by the doctrine of in loco parentis, thus violating students’ free 
speech rights and, arguably, the parents’ rights as well.151 
Furthermore, although school officials do indeed possess 
“comprehensive authority” over students due to the “important, 
delicate, and highly discretionary” nature of public education,152 
such authority is not absolute and must be carefully balanced 
against the students’ First Amendment rights.  This premise was 
determinative in the Third Circuit’s holding in Snyder v. Blue 
Mountain School District, in which a student was suspended for 
creating a MySpace profile that made fun of her school’s 
principal.153  While recognizing a school’s authority over its 
students, the court emphasized that “[t]he authority of public 
school officials is not boundless.”154  Because the student merely 
created the profile as a joke, did not actually identify the principal 
by name, school, or location, and took specific steps to ensure the 
profile remained private so that only she and her friends could 
access it, the court reasoned that “it was clearly not reasonably 
150. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38-39
(2d Cir. 2007). 
151. Allison Belnap, Tinker at a Breaking Point: Why the Specter of Cyberbullying
Cannot Excuse Impermissible Public School Regulation of Off-Campus Student Speech, 
2011 BYU L. REV. 501, 528 (2011) (arguing that the extension of Tinker to apply to “speech 
[that] occur[s] away from school property, without the assistance of any school resources, 
and . . . not offered at or in conjunction with any school-sanctioned event . . . would allow 
schools to exercise in loco parentis influence well beyond appropriate limitations and would 
infringe not only on the student’s free speech and privacy rights, but on parents’ rights as 
well”). 
152. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969);
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637. 
153. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011).
154. Id. at 926.
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foreseeable that [the student’s] speech would create a substantial 
disruption . . . in school.”155  Rather, the principal likely 
suspended the student based on the humiliation he experienced as 
a result of the profile, which was insufficient to justify 
infringement on the student’s right to freedom of expression.156 
C. Provides Little Protection for Online Speech
Finally, there is an argument among scholars that the 
foreseeability threshold provides very little, if any, protection for 
online speech due the expansive reach of the Internet, as well as 
the ever-increasing popularity of social media.157  As of 
December 2019, the world’s population was 7.8 billion.158  
Among those 7.8 billion people, 4.54 billion use the Internet, and 
3.725 billion are active on social media.159  The number of social 
media users worldwide has increased by 1.8 billion since 2010, 
when it stood at only 0.97 billion people.160  Furthermore, in the 
United States alone, the percentage of people who use social 
media has increased from forty-four percent in 2010 to seventy-
nine percent in 2019.161 
155. Id. at 929-30.
156. Id. at 930 (noting the need for courts to “determine when an ‘undifferentiated fear
or apprehension of disturbance’ transforms into a reasonable forecast that a substantial 
disruption or material interference will occur”) (internal citations omitted). 
157. Ferry, supra note 54, at 754 (“[The foreseeability threshold] subjects speech that
is spoken or written on paper to a higher degree of protection than speech that is written 
online due to the pervasive nature of the Internet.”); Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School 
Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers & Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue 
the Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 235-36 (2009) 
(expressing “three reasons why it is reasonably foreseeable that nearly any and all 
controversial provocative speech that is created and posted off campus by a student will come 
to the attention of school authorities,” including the possibilities that: (1) “at least one student 
in a school will play the role of whistleblower or snitch and reveal the misdeeds of others”; 
(2) “some teachers and principals will proactively search online, via Google, Yahoo or other
search engines, for postings about themselves or their school”; and (3) any “hallway gossip
and buzz” about the speech “might be overheard by school officials”).
158. Kit Smith, 126 Amazing Social Media Statistics and Facts, BRANDWATCH (Dec.
30, 2019), [https://perma.cc/H74P-F6TT]. 
159. Id.
160. J. Clement, Number of Social Media Users Worldwide from 2010 to 2021,
STATISTA (Aug. 14, 2019), [https://perma.cc/3K69-YT4J]. 
161. J. Clement, Percentage of U.S. Population Who Currently Use Any Social Media
from 2008 to 2019, STATISTA (Aug. 9, 2019), [https://perma.cc/VQM5-C5PB]. 
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With these statistics in mind, it becomes difficult to imagine 
how any online speech could possibly be shielded from discovery 
by school administrators.  Even if school administrators do not 
themselves discover the speech, other students are likely to 
discover it and bring it to their attention.162  This is often true even 
where a student takes extensive precautionary measures to protect 
the privacy of his or her speech.  For example, consider again the 
facts of S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District, 
in which the Eighth Circuit used the foreseeability threshold to 
uphold the punishment of two high school students who created a 
website containing racist and sexually explicit blog posts about 
their classmates.163  Despite the students’ efforts to maintain the 
privacy of the posts by using a foreign domain website, which 
prevented people in the United States from finding the website 
through a typical online search, the court agreed with the school 
administrators that it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech 
would reach the school.164  In doing so, the court essentially 
implied that any online speech regarding a student, teacher, or 
anything related to the school will automatically satisfy the 
foreseeability threshold, and is therefore given far less protection 
than speech that is written or spoken.165 
VI. CONCLUSION
The “schoolhouse gate,” of which Justice Fortas spoke with 
such reverence, has been all but obliterated.  As scholars have 
expressed time and time again, it has become virtually impossible 
to find the proper balance between students’ rights to engage 
freely in off-campus discussion and a school’s interest in 
protecting the school environment from disruption.  Unless the 
Supreme Court acts quickly, lower courts’ attempts to maintain 
162. Calvert, supra note 157, at 235-36.
163. S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 771, 774 (8th
Cir. 2012). 
164. Id. at 773, 778.
165. Kathryn S. Vander Broek et al., Schools and Social Media: First Amendment
Issues Arising from Student Use of the Internet, 21 NO. 4 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 11, 14 
(2009) (“The spoken or printed word is capable of reaching a finite and limited audience. 
Information posted on the Internet can instantaneously reach a far larger audience potentially 
anywhere in the world.”). 
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this balance will continue to produce results that are disjointed 
and unpredictable.  More specifically, however, schools will 
continue to punish students any time it is “reasonably 
foreseeable” that their speech will reach the school 
environment—a standard that has numerous implications and 
ultimately fails to protect a student’s First Amendment interests. 
